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LITIGATION UNDER ERISA
INTRODUCTION
Russell K Osgood*
The passage and implementation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)I has now led to a significant
flow of cases within the federal court system. For the most part,
these cases involve the fiduciary and reporting and disclosure portions of ERISA, rather than the detailed regulation by the Internal
Revenue Code of certain "qualified" plans.
The four notes which comprise this student symposium demonstrate that decisions about the numerous issues left unanswered by
the general language of ERISA's fiduciary provisions are part of the
species of general federal law and not an isolated genus of "pension" law. The notes involve four major questions: (i) whether in
light of the availability of arbitral or administrative remedies under a
plan litigation may be undertaken before or only after the pursuit of
those remedies, (ii) what standard of review courts should apply in
considering a fiduciary's denial of a claim for benefits, (iii) whether
courts may award extracontractual or punitive damages, especially
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell,2 and (iv) under what circumstances courts
should award attorney's fees upon the conclusion of such litigation.
Many employee benefit plans are collectively bargained and
many are not. Collectively bargained plans are significantly affected
by the applicability of a well-developed general federal labor law.
One of the central provisions of that labor law is the reliance on
binding arbitration to mold and hopefully resolve disputes.3 Reliance on the arbitral process has led, to a considerable degree, to an
ouster of substantive review by the courts of the results of that process, except in the case of allegations concerning the legitimacy or
integrity of the process. 4 The courts have demurred in certain cases
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105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).
3 C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, LABOR LAw 764-77 (1982). For a recent case on the importance of arbitration, see AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418-19 (1986).
4 See C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, supra note 3, at 854-57.
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concerning the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the context
of claims based on federal statutes like the antitrust and securities
laws. 5 As shown in the first note of this symposium, the issue remains vibrant in the context of ERISA in those cases in which the
trustees of jointly-sponsored union-employer plans, typically operated pursuant, in part, to a collective bargaining agreement with an
arbitration clause, have powers of plan design and amendment held
by the employer alone in the non-collectively bargained context.
The issue of what standard should be applied in reviewing a
fiduciary's action is as fundamental an issue as courts face in the
complex world of modem federal regulatory statutes. The precise
resolution of the question may only modestly affect actual litigation
because courts frequently tailor the application of their standard of
review to accommodate or produce the decision they have made on
the merits (as they often do in issues of standing). But erecting a
high standard of review, even if it is handled flexibly once a case is in
the courts, actively discourages litigation. As the second note in this
symposium points out, it is puzzling that the courts looking at the
same fiduciary provision of ERISA have applied more than one standard of review based on the factual context of the fiduciary's
conduct.
ERISA generally gives an aggrieved participant the right to sue
for damages but the statute does not specify what kinds of damages
are available. In Massachusetts Mutual Life InsuranceCo. v. Russell 6 the
Supreme Court held that punitive damages may not be recovered
under one of ERISA's remedial provisions, section 409. But the
various opinions in Massachusetts Mutual do not provide a general
answer to the question and the lower courts are currently struggling
with this issue. 7 The Massachusetts Mutual opinions make it clear that
there is likely to be disagreement on the Supreme Court on this
larger issue which will have to be resolved by reference to the types
of inquiries contained in the third note.
ERISA explicitly provides for the awarding of attorney's fees in
appropriate situations. Not surprisingly this has generated a significant amount of litigation. The courts have attempted to establish
and apply standards to decide which litigants might be entitled to
such fees given continued adherence to the general American Rule
disfavoring fee awards. The fourth note investigates this complex
issue.
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In the aggregate these four notes demonstrate that in answering questions about a general and sometimes vague statute, like ERISA, the courts and commentators ought first to study the particular
context of that statute, in this case employee benefit plans and employment patterns generally. Second, recourse should be made to
proximate, general provisions of federal statutory or common law.
It would be unwise, for instance, not to think about how the awarding of attorney's fees under ERISA relates to the highly developed
case law under the federal civil rights statutes. It would be foolish to
fail to consider the issue of awarding punitive damages in the larger
context of federal remedial law or whether to defer to the arbitral
process in its labor law domain.
Pension cases may, because of their particular context, provide
peculiar and nongeneral answers. For instance, although Congress
referred to the corpus of state fiduciary law in setting the general
fiduciary rules of ERISA, it also noted that such law would have to
be tailored to the pension context. Thus, the second note shows
that state fiduciary law, which generally defers to fiduciary determinations as to benefit distributions, may not be appropriate in the
context of employee benefit plans.
Pension and other employee benefit issues may also generate
more or less typically federal answers to subsidiary issues that parallel general legal developments as the nature of employment in
American society evolves. Perhaps employment, particularly for
skilled, blue-collar workers, is becoming less stable. Some think that
as the economy reorients itself to service jobs performed at computer terminals the home may again become a significant situs of
paid employment. The role of unions is also at least temporarily
waning and this may also impact the development of the law of fiduciary obligations under ERISA. If any or all of these trends prove to
be significant, it may justify a more protective approach by courts to
employee interests in pensions and other benefit programs.

